A Probabilistic Voting Model of Indirect Taxation
I analyze a probabilistic voting model where two office-motivated candidates choose an indirect taxation policy to maximize the probability of winning the election, in a society divided into a finite number of groups, whose members have different preferences for the consumption of goods. Results show how candidates must satisfy those groups whose political power is higher. In equilibrium the more powerful groups obtain lower tax rates on those goods they prefer more.
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Volume (Year): 67 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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- Bas Jacobs & A. Lans Bovenberg, 2011.
"Optimal Taxation of Human Capital and the Earnings Function,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory,
Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(6), pages 957-971, December.
- Bas Jacobs & Lans Bovenberg, 2008. "Optimal Taxation of Human Capital and the Earnings Function," CESifo Working Paper Series 2250, CESifo Group Munich.
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