A Probabilistic Voting Model of Indirect Taxation
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References listed on IDEAS
- Bas Jacobs & A. Lans Bovenberg, 2011.
"Optimal Taxation of Human Capital and the Earnings Function,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory,
Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(6), pages 957-971, December.
- Bas Jacobs & Lans Bovenberg, 2008. "Optimal Taxation of Human Capital and the Earnings Function," CESifo Working Paper Series 2250, CESifo Group Munich.
- repec:zbw:rwirep:0210 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
Keywordsprobabilistic voting theory; indirect taxation; public expenditure;
- D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
- H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
- H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
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