Tax Evasion with Earned Income - An Experimental Study
In our tax evasion experiment each participant earns his income by solving intertemporal allocation tasks. The resulting income has to be declared in a tax return which is randomly verified. If tax evasion is detected, the subject is punished by a fixed penalty capturing the fact that (in Germany) tax fraud is a crime. The experiment consists of four tax periods, the final two involving an increased tax rate. Taxes are donated to charity organizations, chosen by subjects. According to our results higher income levels encourage tax evasion, surprisingly an increased tax rate does not.
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Volume (Year): 58 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
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