Evaluating the Basle Guidelines for Backtesting Banks' Internal Risk Management Models
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- Alexander, Gordon J. & Baptista, Alexandre M. & Yan, Shu, 2012. "Bank regulation and stability: An examination of the Basel market risk framework," Discussion Papers 09/2012, Deutsche Bundesbank.
- Alexander, Gordon J. & Baptista, Alexandre M. & Yan, Shu, 2013. "A comparison of the original and revised Basel market risk frameworks for regulating bank capital," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 249-268.
- Gyöngyi Bugár & Anita Ratting, 2016. "Revision of the quantification of market risk in the Basel III regulatory framework," Financial and Economic Review, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary), vol. 15(1), pages 33-50.
- Alexander, Gordon J. & Baptista, Alexandre M. & Yan, Shu, 2012. "When more is less: Using multiple constraints to reduce tail risk," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(10), pages 2693-2716.
- Pérignon, Christophe & Deng, Zi Yin & Wang, Zhi Jun, 2008. "Do banks overstate their Value-at-Risk?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 783-794, May.
- Ralf Sabiwalsky, 2012. "Does Basel II Pillar 3 Risk Exposure Data help to Identify Risky Banks?," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2012-008, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
- Alexander, Gordon J. & Baptista, Alexandre M. & Yan, Shu, 2014. "Bank regulation and international financial stability: A case against the 2006 Basel framework for controlling tail risk in trading books," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 107-130.
- Bernardo da Veiga & Felix Chan & Michael McAleer, 2009.
"It Pays to Violate: How Effective are the Basel Accord Penalties?,"
CIRJE-F-683, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Bernardo da Veiga & Felix Chan & Michael McAleer, 2009. "It Pays to Violate: How Effective are the Basel Accord Penalties?," CARF F-Series CARF-F-186, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- da Veiga, B. & Chan, F. & McAleer, M.J., 2009. "It Pays to Violate: How Effective are the Basel Accord Penalties?," Econometric Institute Research Papers EI 2009-39, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus School of Economics (ESE), Econometric Institute.
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