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Selección adversa en la convocatoria docente para educación primaria, media y básica en Colombia

Author

Listed:
  • David Tobón Orozco

    () (Universidad de Antioquia)

  • Piedad Patricia Restrepo R.

    () (Universidad de Antioquia)

  • Paul Ríos Gallego

    () (Grupo de Microeconomía Aplicada)

Abstract

This paper analyses the selection of teachers in basic and media education in Colombia under an adverse selection model. We monitor the teacher´s wages and the institutional change, and the results of one of the contests for Medellin. The relative wages of attachment to the teaching profession are competitive, but the incentives are limited in time. In the analyzed contest the non-teaching professionals are going relatively well in the written tests, but lose that advantage in the analysis of their curriculum vitae and the interview, evidencing a high interference by local authorities in those results. We conclude that a change in management and valuation, as in the administration of both activities, delegating in independent institutions increase the efficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • David Tobón Orozco & Piedad Patricia Restrepo R. & Paul Ríos Gallego, 2007. "Selección adversa en la convocatoria docente para educación primaria, media y básica en Colombia," Lecturas de Economía, Universidad de Antioquia, Departamento de Economía, issue 67, pages 161-194, Julio-Dic.
  • Handle: RePEc:lde:journl:y:2007:i:67:p:161-194
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    Keywords

    Adverse selection; teaching selection; incentives; wages; education quality;

    JEL classification:

    • A21 - General Economics and Teaching - - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics - - - Pre-college
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials

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