The Number of Rent-Seekers and Aggregate Rent-Seeking Expenditures: An Unpleasant Result
The author examines a rent-seeking contest in which the winner gets a minimum rent but also gets an additional rent that is an increasing function of his lobbying expenditure. He gives real-world examples of such rent-seeking competitions. Contrary to the standard result in the rent-seeking literature, the author obtains the perverse result that aggregate rent-seeking expenditures may be inversely related to the number of rentseekers. However, he notes that, even if this result holds, the cost of administering rent-seeking competitions may imply that society is better-off with fewer contenders than with an infinitely large number of contenders, although the optimal number may not be the smallest number. Copyright 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:99:y:1999:i:1-2:p:57-62. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.