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Campaign Advertising and Political Ambiguity

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  • Chappell, Henry W, Jr

Abstract

This paper develops a model to explain candidates' strategic decisions to provide or withhold information about policy positions in the course of an election campaign. The analysis treats this problem as a game of imperfect information. Attention is focused on modeling voter suspicion of candidates whose positions are ambiguous. Specific numerical examples illustrate that candidate decisions about providing information via informative advertising depend upon candidate policy preferences, campaign fund endowments, partisan reputations, and incumbency status. The model also provides theoretical underpinnings for empirical findings regarding the effects of campaign advertising. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Chappell, Henry W, Jr, 1994. "Campaign Advertising and Political Ambiguity," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(3-4), pages 281-303, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:79:y:1994:i:3-4:p:281-303
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    Cited by:

    1. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph & van Winden, Frans, 1997. "Campaign expenditures, contributions and direct endorsements: The strategic use of information and money to influence voter behavior," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 1-31, February.
    2. Westermark, Andreas, 2004. "Extremism, campaigning and ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 421-452, May.
    3. repec:kap:pubcho:v:173:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-017-0461-9 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Depken, Craig A., 1998. "The effects of campaign contribution sources on the congressional elections of 1996," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 211-215, February.
    5. Tangeras, T.P., 1998. "On the Role of Public Opinion Polls in Political Competition," Papers 655, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
    6. Westermark, Andreas, 2001. "Campaigning and Ambiguity when Parties Cannot Make Credible Election Promises," Working Paper Series 568, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    7. repec:kap:pubcho:v:172:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-017-0459-3 is not listed on IDEAS

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