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Looking beyond reelection: Revising assumptions about the factors motivating congressional behavior

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  • Glenn Parker

Abstract

This paper challenges the assumption inherent in most models of legislative behavior — namely that congressmen are driven by the desire for reelection. I offer an alternative perspective: incumbents seek to maximize their discretionary investments and the income generated by the job. The only constraint on this behavior is that legislators provide a satisfactory level of constituency service — a product that I suggest entails slight opportunity, and few manufacturing, costs for congressmen, and one that is unlikely to lose its value with increased production. I also demonstrate that increases in salary and discretionary investments have lengthened congressional careers. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Suggested Citation

  • Glenn Parker, 1989. "Looking beyond reelection: Revising assumptions about the factors motivating congressional behavior," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(3), pages 237-252, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:63:y:1989:i:3:p:237-252
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00138164
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    2. Weingast, Barry R & Marshall, William J, 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 132-163, February.
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    4. Westefield, Louis P., 1974. "Majority Party Leadership and the Committee System in the House of Representatives," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(4), pages 1593-1604, December.
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    9. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
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    5. Randall G. Holcombe & Jeffrey A. Mills, 1995. "Politics and Deficit Finance," Public Finance Review, , vol. 23(4), pages 448-466, October.

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