Fragile Redistribution Choices behind a Veil of Ignorance
Prescription dealing with redistribution questions are often influenced by the presumption that individuals behind a veil of ignorance will choose rules that lead to a greater equality of outcomes. However, such preferences may be fragile and dependent on particular circumstances. To the extent that initial distributions are seen to be deserved, for example, people may not choose to impose losses on some individuals to confer benefits on others. A series of tests in which individuals chose between alternative distribution rules under circumstances approximating a veil of ignorance showed large differences in redistribution preferences. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 14 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/11166/PS2|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:14:y:1997:i:1:p:63-74. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.