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Closure Policy when Bank Inspection Can Be Manipulated

Author

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  • Aleix Calveras

Abstract

This paper analyzes inspection and closure policies of a bank, and the strategic reaction of its managers/shareholders when they can (costly) manipulate the information available to the regulator. We derive optimal intervention policy, and analyze its effect on managerial strategies. Regulatory intervention may induce shareholders to manipulate the information available to the regulator in order to avoid intervention and closure, and we find that these incentives to manipulate information may increase with tighter capital requirements. Finally we show that, in order to avoid manipulation by the banker, some degree of forbearance in closure may be ex ante optimal.

Suggested Citation

  • Aleix Calveras, 2003. "Closure Policy when Bank Inspection Can Be Manipulated," Review of Finance, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 385-408.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:eurfin:v:7:y:2003:i:3:p:385-408
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    Cited by:

    1. Vinogradov, Dmitri, 2012. "Destructive effects of constructive ambiguity in risky times," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 1459-1481.
    2. Kladakis, George & Chen, Lei & Bellos, Sotirios K., 2020. "Bank asset and informational quality," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    3. de Haan, Thomas & Offerman, Theo & Sloof, Randolph, 2011. "Noisy signaling: Theory and experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 402-428.
    4. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2018_011 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Ristolainen, Kim, 2018. "Getting better? The effect of the single supervisory mechanism on banks' loan loss reporting and loan loss reserves," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 11/2018, Bank of Finland.
    6. Ristolainen, Kim, 2018. "Getting better? The effect of the single supervisory mechanism on banks' loan loss reporting and loan loss reserves," Research Discussion Papers 11/2018, Bank of Finland.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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