Valuing Easements: A Simple Bargaining Framework
The literatureâ€™s guidance on appraising easement values is limited, such as the sometimes unworkable advice to locate appropriate comparables. A simple economic analysis involving applications of bargaining theory (splitting a cooperative surplus) and game theory (anticipating other partiesâ€™ actions) might provide a viable alternative means of analysis in some easement situations.
Volume (Year): 16 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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- Colwell, Peter F & Yavas, Abdullah, 1994. "The Demand for Agricultural Land and Strategic Bidding in Auctions," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 137-149, March.
- Kim, Taewon, 1989. "Bidding in Real Estate: A Game Theoretic Approach," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 2(4), pages 239-251, December.
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