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Consequences of CEO Overconfidence

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  • Qiuhong Zhao
  • Dave A. Ziebart

Abstract

We test the impact of CEO overconfidence on the cost of debt and the impact of SOX on overconfidence via CEO selection. Our CEO overconfidence measure is based on the degree of optimism in management earnings forecasts, and the measure for the cost of debt is bond yield spreads. Our evidence supports that the market discounts CEO overconfidence by increasing the cost of borrowing. Moreover, we find that the financial market also incorporates past CEO overconfidence into bond pricing. We document that the board prefers to appoint a more rational CEO over an overconfident CEO. Our findings are consistent with Banerjee et al.’s (2015) argument that an independent board mitigates the costs of CEO overconfidence in terms of investment and risk exposure.

Suggested Citation

  • Qiuhong Zhao & Dave A. Ziebart, 2017. "Consequences of CEO Overconfidence," Accounting and Finance Research, Sciedu Press, vol. 6(2), pages 1-94, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:jfr:afr111:v:6:y:2017:i:2:p:94
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David A. Ziebart & Sara A. Reiter, 1992. "Bond ratings, bond yields and financial information," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 9(1), pages 252-282, September.
    2. Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, 2005. "CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(6), pages 2661-2700, December.
    3. Sattar A. Mansi & William F. Maxwell & Darius P. Miller, 2004. "Does Auditor Quality and Tenure Matter to Investors? Evidence from the Bond Market," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(4), pages 755-793, September.
    4. Phillip C. Stocken, 2000. "Credibility of Voluntary Disclosure," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(2), pages 359-374, Summer.
    5. Trueman, Brett, 1986. "Why do managers voluntarily release earnings forecasts?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 53-71, March.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

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