A Bilevel Model of Taxation and Its Application to Optimal Highway Pricing
We consider a bilevel model where the leader wants to maximize revenues from a taxation scheme, while the follower rationally reacts to those tax levels. We focus our attention on the special case of a toll-setting problem defined on a multicommodity transportation network. We show that the general problem is NP-complete, while particular instances are polynomially solvable. Numerical examples are given.
Volume (Year): 44 (1998)
Issue (Month): 12-Part-1 (December)
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- van Ackere, Ann, 1993. "The principal/agent paradigm: Its relevance to various functional fields," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 83-103, October.
- Leurent, Fabien, 1993. "Cost versus time equilibrium over a network," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 205-221, December.
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