IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/imx/journl/v14y2019i4p745-767.html

Social Weights and the Regional Allocation of Inter-Governmental Transfers

Author

Listed:
  • Raul Alberto Ponce Rodriguez

    (Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez, México)

  • Benito Alan Ponce Rodriguez

    (Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez, México)

Abstract

Desarrollamos una teoría de transferencias intergubernamentales optimas y un análisis de simulación que nos permite estimar las transferencias óptimas de recursos del gobierno central a los gobiernos estatales en México. Nuestros resultados son: Primero, nuestros modelos demuestran que el mejor predictor de las transferencias intergubernamentales observadas en México es la densidad poblacional. Segundo, nuestro trabajo provee recomendaciones de política económica al proporcionar estimaciones sobre la proporción óptima de transferencias intergubernamentales a los estados en México. Nuestro análisis es el primero en desarrollar estimaciones de las transferencias intergubernamentales al utilizar funciones paramétricas Paretianas de la distribución regional del ingreso y las preferencias inter-regionales por el gasto público local. Nuestras estimaciones ayudan a entender las ventajas y desventajas del sistema actual de transferencias y, adicionalmente, propone una alternativa de asignación de las transferencias intergubernamentales que podría mejorar el bienestar asociado con el gasto público local en México.

Suggested Citation

  • Raul Alberto Ponce Rodriguez & Benito Alan Ponce Rodriguez, 2019. "Social Weights and the Regional Allocation of Inter-Governmental Transfers," Remef - Revista Mexicana de Economía y Finanzas Nueva Época REMEF (The Mexican Journal of Economics and Finance), Instituto Mexicano de Ejecutivos de Finanzas, IMEF, vol. 14(4), pages 745-767, Octubre -.
    • Handle: RePEc:imx:journl:v:14:y:2019:i:4:p:745-767
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.remef.org.mx/index.php/remef/article/view/389
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Raúl A Ponce-Rodríguez & Charles R Hankla & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Eunice Heredia-Ortiz, 2018. "Rethinking the Political Economy of Decentralization: How Elections and Parties Shape the Provision of Local Public Goods," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 48(4), pages 523-558.
    2. Emmanuel Saez & Stefanie Stantcheva, 2016. "Generalized Social Marginal Welfare Weights for Optimal Tax Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(1), pages 24-45, January.
    3. Bergstrom, Theodore C & Rubinfeld, Daniel L & Shapiro, Perry, 1982. "Micro-Based Estimates of Demand Functions for Local School Expenditures," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1183-1205, September.
    4. Charles R. Hankla & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Raúl A. Ponce Rodríguez, 2019. "Local Accountability and National Coordination in Fiscal Federalism," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 18495.
    5. Atkinson, A. B. & Stiglitz, J. E., 1976. "The design of tax structure: Direct versus indirect taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1-2), pages 55-75.
    6. Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-927, October.
    7. Michael Smart, 1998. "Taxation and Deadweight Loss in a System of Intergovernmental Transfers," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(1), pages 189-206, February.
    8. Ben Lockwood, 2008. "Voting, Lobbying, And The Decentralization Theorem," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 416-431, November.
    9. Atkinson, A. B. & Stiglitz, J. E., 1972. "The structure of indirect taxation and economic efficiency," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 97-119, April.
    10. James Ferris, 1983. "Demands for public spending: An attitudinal approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 135-154, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Raúl Alberto Ponce Rodríguez & Benito Alan Ponce Rodríguez, 2021. "Regional Heterogeneity of Preferences and Intergovernmental Transfers," Economies, MDPI, vol. 9(1), pages 1-21, March.
    2. Boadway,Robin & Cuff,Katherine, 2022. "Tax Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108949453.
    3. Raúl A. Ponce-Rodríguez & Charles R. Hankla & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Eunice Heredia-Ortiz, 2020. "The politics of fiscal federalism: Building a stronger decentralization theorem," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(4), pages 605-639, October.
    4. Chirvi, Malte & Schneider, Cornelius, 2020. "Preferences for wealth taxation: Design, framing and the role of partisanship," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 260, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
    5. Chirvi, Malte & Schneider, Cornelius, 2019. "Stated preferences for capital taxation - tax design, misinformation and the role of partisanship," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 242, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
    6. European Commission, 2013. "Tax reforms in EU Member States - Tax policy challenges for economic growth and fiscal sustainability – 2013 Report," Taxation Papers 38, Directorate General Taxation and Customs Union, European Commission.
    7. Firouz Gahvari & Luca Micheletto, 2019. "Heterogeneity, monetary policy, Mirrleesian taxes, and the Friedman rule," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 67(4), pages 983-1018, June.
    8. Maitreesh Ghatak & François Maniquet, 2019. "Universal Basic Income: Some Theoretical Aspects," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 11(1), pages 895-928, August.
    9. Richter, Wolfram F., 2009. "Taxing education in Ramsey's tradition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(11-12), pages 1254-1260, December.
    10. Karl Schulz, 2021. "Redistribution of Return Inequality," CESifo Working Paper Series 8996, CESifo.
    11. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2015. "In Praise of Frank Ramsey's Contribution to the Theory of Taxation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 0(583), pages 235-268, March.
    12. Åsa Johansson, 2016. "Public Finance, Economic Growth and Inequality: A Survey of the Evidence," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 1346, OECD Publishing.
    13. Marko Ledić & Ivica Rubil, 2026. "How do indirect taxes reshape tax-benefit-revealed social preferences for redistribution?," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 53(1), pages 167-199, February.
    14. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 2018. "Pareto efficient taxation and expenditures: Pre- and re-distribution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 101-119.
    15. Saez, Emmanuel & Stantcheva, Stefanie, 2018. "A simpler theory of optimal capital taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 120-142.
    16. Asen Ivanov, 2023. "Borda-optimal taxation of labour income," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(3), pages 331-364, April.
    17. Bierbrauer Felix J., 2016. "Effizienz oder Gerechtigkeit?: Ungleiche Einkommen, ungleiche Vermögen und Optimale Steuern," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 2-24, April.
    18. Støstad, Morten Nyborg & Cowell, Frank, 2024. "Inequality as an externality: Consequences for tax design," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 235(C).
    19. Pierre Bachas & Lucie Gadenne & Anders Jensen, 2024. "Informality, Consumption Taxes, and Redistribution," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 91(5), pages 2604-2634.
    20. Raul A. Ponce-Rodriguez & Charles R. Hankla & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Eunice Heredia-Ortiz, 2016. "Political Institutions and Federalism: A "Strong" Decentralization Theorem," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1603, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:imx:journl:v:14:y:2019:i:4:p:745-767. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Ricardo Mendoza (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.remef.org.mx/index.php/remef/index .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.