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Study on Emission Control of Berthing Vessels-Based on Non-Cooperative Game Theory

Author

Listed:
  • Qin Wang

    (College of Transport and Communications, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306, China)

  • Minhang Jiang

    (College of Transport and Communications, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306, China)

Abstract

To accomplish IMO’s emission reduction targets, the Chinese government has established emission control areas and implemented strict sulfur limitation policies. Faced with a downturn in the shipping industry and the challenge of an insufficient supply of compliant fuel, Hong Kong and Shenzhen in China have implemented different low-sulfur fuel oil subsidy policies. It is particularly important to study non-cooperative games between two ports considering low-sulfur fuel oil subsidies. In this paper, first, non-cooperative game models considering low-sulfur fuel oil subsidies are constructed. Second, the mechanisms of various factors affecting port pricing, throughput and profit are analyzed. Then, a case study is conducted using AIS data of container ships in Shanghai and Ningbo-Zhoushan ports. The study reveals that in both sequential and simultaneous games, the gross tonnage of a ship has an impact on the optimal service price, throughput and profit of the port. The subsidy rate has a positive impact on the profitability of the port itself, to the detriment of competitor ports. In conclusion, a low-sulfur fuel oil subsidy policy has a significant positive impact on the step-by-step implementation of more stringent air pollution reduction policies in port waters.

Suggested Citation

  • Qin Wang & Minhang Jiang, 2023. "Study on Emission Control of Berthing Vessels-Based on Non-Cooperative Game Theory," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(13), pages 1-17, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:15:y:2023:i:13:p:10572-:d:1187182
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Zheng, Shiyuan & Negenborn, Rudy R., 2014. "Centralization or decentralization: A comparative analysis of port regulation modes," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 21-40.
    2. Gang Dong & Dandan Zhong, 2019. "Tacit Collusion of Pricing Strategy Game between Regional Ports: The Case of Yangtze River Economic Belt," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(2), pages 1-17, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Teresa Abramowicz-Gerigk & Zbigniew Burciu & Miroslaw K. Gerigk & Jacek Jachowski, 2024. "Monitoring of Ship Operations in Seaport Areas in the Sustainable Development of Ocean–Land Connections," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 16(2), pages 1-15, January.

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