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Impact of Governance Structure of Rural Collective Economic Organizations on Trading Efficiency of Collective Construction Land of China

Author

Listed:
  • Meie Deng

    (School of Management, Wuhan Polytechnic University, Wuhan 430048, China)

  • Anlu Zhang

    (College of Land Management, Huazhong Agricultural University, Wuhan 430070, China)

  • Wei Luo

    (School of Management, Wuhan Polytechnic University, Wuhan 430048, China)

  • Canwei Hu

    (School of Management, Wuhan Polytechnic University, Wuhan 430048, China)

  • Meng Huang

    (School of Management, Wuhan Polytechnic University, Wuhan 430048, China)

  • Congxi Cheng

    (School of Management, Wuhan Polytechnic University, Wuhan 430048, China)

Abstract

In order to enable urban economic development, the use of the right value and asset value of rural collective construction land (RCCL) is increasingly becoming apparent and this market is experiencing rapid development. However, the arrangement of the governance structure of rural shareholding cooperatives (RSCs) can seriously affect the efficiency of collective construction land market transactions, since the governance of RSCs is related to the interests of farmers. Protecting the rights and interests of farmers while improving the governance efficiency of RSCs is a considerable challenge worldwide. To better deal with this challenge, this study used a field survey in Nanhai District, Guangdong Province, China, to estimate how the governance structure of RSCs affect the efficiency of RCCL market transactions. Tobit models were constructed, and the results show that (1) most of the governance functions of RSCs were not separate from the administrative management of the village committees, which leads to low efficiency of RSCs’ governance; (2) leaders of rural collective economic organizations played a key role in governance efficiency; (3) from the perspective of collective land property rights, most village shareholders did not have decision-making power or supervisory authority in the RCCL transfers because they could not complete access to transaction information. Furthermore, most villagers felt that the amount of income distributed was unreasonable, and the rights and interests of farmers and village shareholders were not guaranteed by the RSCs. Therefore, we suggest that the Chinese authorities should strengthen their current efforts to construct a more open and fair governance structure of the RSCs and thus improve their market transaction efficiency. Our work provides some insights into ways to improve the governance structure and market transaction efficiency of RSCs, which can further contribute to the development of the RCCL market in other areas of China and worldwide.

Suggested Citation

  • Meie Deng & Anlu Zhang & Wei Luo & Canwei Hu & Meng Huang & Congxi Cheng, 2023. "Impact of Governance Structure of Rural Collective Economic Organizations on Trading Efficiency of Collective Construction Land of China," Land, MDPI, vol. 12(2), pages 1-15, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jlands:v:12:y:2023:i:2:p:381-:d:1052459
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Xiaowenxu Yue & Yanyan Li & Li Zhou, 2023. "The Impact of Empowerment Practice on the Rural Collective Economy: Empirical Evidence from Rural Communities in China," Land, MDPI, vol. 12(4), pages 1-20, April.
    2. Xiang Li & Jiang Zhu & Tao Liu & Xiangdong Yin & Jiangchun Yao & Hao Jiang & Bing Bu & Jianlong Yan & Yixuan Li & Zhangcheng Chen, 2023. "Quota and Space Allocations of New Urban Land Supported by Urban Growth Simulations: A Case Study of Guangzhou City, China," Land, MDPI, vol. 12(6), pages 1-21, June.
    3. Xiaoping Zhong & Shaojie Zhou & Xiaohua Yu, 2024. "Land market misallocation, regional integration, and economic growth: Evidence from the Yangtze River Delta Region, China," Public Administration & Development, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(1), pages 17-31, February.
    4. Jiayi Wang & Yongping Wang, 2024. "Economic performance of rural collective‐owned cooperatives: Determinants and influence mechanism," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 95(3), pages 629-653, September.

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