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Coordination, Differentiation and Fairness in a Population of Cooperating Agents

  • Anne-Ly Do


    (Max Planck Institute for the Physics of Complex Systems, Nöthnitzer Str. 38, Dresden 01187, Germany)

  • Lars Rudolf


    (Department of Engineering Mathematics, University of Bristol, Merchant Venturers Building, Bristol BS8 1TR, UK)

  • Thilo Gross


    (Department of Engineering Mathematics, University of Bristol, Merchant Venturers Building, Bristol BS8 1TR, UK)

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    In a recent paper, we analyzed the self-assembly of a complex cooperation network. The network was shown to approach a state where every agent invests the same amount of resources. Nevertheless, highly-connected agents arise that extract extraordinarily high payoffs while contributing comparably little to any of their cooperations. Here, we investigate a variant of the model, in which highly-connected agents have access to additional resources. We study analytically and numerically whether these resources are invested in existing collaborations, leading to a fairer load distribution, or in establishing new collaborations, leading to an even less fair distribution of loads and payoffs.

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    Article provided by MDPI, Open Access Journal in its journal Games.

    Volume (Year): 3 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 1 (March)
    Pages: 30-40

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    Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:3:y:2012:i:1:p:30-40:d:16484
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