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Supervising bank safety and soundness: some open issues

  • Mark J. Flannery

This article identifies underresearched and/or underappreciated issues that affect bank safety and soundness or financial system stability. The author begins by discussing the goals of safety and soundness supervision and then focuses on seven imperfectly understood, and often intertwined, issues: credit rating agencies; the combination of banking and commerce; nationwide depositor preference and the distribution of liability-holders' risk exposures; systemic risk; capital adequacy; market discipline; and credible resolution procedures for the failure of large financial firms. Many of these open issues are similar to those that Benston et al. discussed in 1986, and all deserve serious scholarly attention, the author notes.

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Article provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta in its journal Economic Review.

Volume (Year): (2007)
Issue (Month): Q1-2 ()
Pages: 83 - 100

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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedaer:y:2007:i:q1-2:p:83-100:n:v.92nos.1-2
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  1. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have," NBER Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicolás S., 1945-, 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Working papers 1523-84., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  3. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
  4. de Bandt, Olivier & Hartmann, Philipp, 2000. "Systemic Risk: A Survey," CEPR Discussion Papers 2634, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Frederick T. Furlong & Simon Kwan, 2006. "Safe & sound banking, 20 years later: what was proposed and what has been adopted," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  6. Kahane, Yehuda, 1977. "Capital adequacy and the regulation of financial intermediaries," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 207-218, October.
  7. Hand, John R M & Holthausen, Robert W & Leftwich, Richard W, 1992. " The Effect of Bond Rating Agency Announcements on Bond and Stock Prices," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(2), pages 733-52, June.
  8. Jeremy C. Stein, 1995. "An Adverse Selection Model of Bank Asset and Liability Management with Implications for the Transmission of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 5217, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Kevin J. Stiroh, 2002. "Diversification in banking: is noninterest income the answer?," Staff Reports 154, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  10. Jorion, Philippe & Liu, Zhu & Shi, Charles, 2005. "Informational effects of regulation FD: evidence from rating agencies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 309-330, May.
  11. Donald P. Morgan, 2002. "Rating Banks: Risk and Uncertainty in an Opaque Industry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 874-888, September.
  12. Patrick de Fontnouvelle & Victoria Garrity & Scott Chu & Eric Rosengren, 2005. "The potential impact of explicit Basel II operational risk capital charges on the competitive environment of processing banks in the United States," Basel II White Paper 4, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
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