Supervising bank safety and soundness: some open issues
This article identifies underresearched and/or underappreciated issues that affect bank safety and soundness or financial system stability. The author begins by discussing the goals of safety and soundness supervision and then focuses on seven imperfectly understood, and often intertwined, issues: credit rating agencies; the combination of banking and commerce; nationwide depositor preference and the distribution of liability-holders' risk exposures; systemic risk; capital adequacy; market discipline; and credible resolution procedures for the failure of large financial firms. Many of these open issues are similar to those that Benston et al. discussed in 1986, and all deserve serious scholarly attention, the author notes.
Volume (Year): (2007)
Issue (Month): Q1-2 ()
Pages: 83 - 100
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