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The Uncertainty in Voting Power: The Case of the Czech Parliament 1996–2004

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  • Elena Mielcová

Abstract

The main aim of this paper is to study the power of legislators in the Lower House of the Czech Parliament in 1996–2004 with respect to power distribution and its uncertainty. A discrepancy between a-priori computed power indices and outcome of voting leads to necessity to reveal the possible source of uncertainty. This paper studies uncertainty in party loyalty, presence and creation of hidden coalitions and explains the addition of these uncertainty issues to computation of power indices. Recalculated power indices exhibit positive improvement.

Suggested Citation

  • Elena Mielcová, 2010. "The Uncertainty in Voting Power: The Case of the Czech Parliament 1996–2004," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 4(2), pages 201-222, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:fau:aucocz:au2010_201
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    File URL: http://auco.cuni.cz/mag/article/download/id/89/type/attachment
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. J. Alonso-Meijide & C. Bowles & M. Holler & S. Napel, 2009. "Monotonicity of power in games with a priori unions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 66(1), pages 17-37, January.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Czech Parliament; power indices; parliamentary voting; uncertainty;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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