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Variazioni neoclassiche

Author

Listed:
  • Carlo Beretta

Abstract

Si argomenta che i tentativi di derivare indicazioni di politica economica dai modelli usuali di economie di perfetta concorrenza sovrastimano le loro capacit? e ignorano i loro limiti. Impersonalit? e anonimit? sono spesso incompatibili con l?efficienza paretiana, se gli agenti si comportano in maniera individualmente razionale. Relazioni personalizzate potenzialmente durature e societ? dotate di un appropriato insieme di regole sociali possono raggiungere soluzioni cooperative come equilibri di Nash, non cooperativi. Le speranze riposte nella recente spinta verso le riforme strutturali possono perci? rivelarsi infondate.

Suggested Citation

  • Carlo Beretta, 2016. "Variazioni neoclassiche," QUADERNI DI ECONOMIA DEL LAVORO, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2016(106), pages 101-119.
    • Handle: RePEc:fan:quaqua:v:html10.3280/qua2016-106006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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