IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

A game version of the Cowan-Zabczyk-Bruss' problem

  • Szajowski, Krzysztof

The paper deals with the continuous-time two person non-zero sum game extension of the no information secretary problem. The objects appear according to the compound Poisson process and each player can choose only one applicant. If both players would like to select the same one, then the priority is assigned randomly. The aim of the players is to choose the best candidate. A construction of Nash equilibria for such game is presented. The extension of the game with randomized stopping times is taken into account. The Nash values for such extension are obtained. Analysis of the solutions for different priority defining lotteries is given.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V1D-4NJ7W65-C/2/8fba42ba6956764607484d5d3205f735
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Statistics & Probability Letters.

Volume (Year): 77 (2007)
Issue (Month): 17 (November)
Pages: 1683-1689

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:eee:stapro:v:77:y:2007:i:17:p:1683-1689
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/622892/description#description

Order Information: Postal: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/supportfaq.cws_home/regional
Web: https://shop.elsevier.com/order?id=505573&ref=505573_01_ooc_1&version=01

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Yasuda, M., 1985. "On a randomized strategy in Neveu's stopping problem," Stochastic Processes and their Applications, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 159-166, December.
  2. Nowak, Andrzej S. & Szajowski, Krzysztof, 1998. "Nonzero-sum Stochastic Games," MPRA Paper 19995, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 1999.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:stapro:v:77:y:2007:i:17:p:1683-1689. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.