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How institutions shape individual motives for efficiency and equity: Evidence from distribution experiments

Author

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  • Ambec, Stefan
  • Garapin, Alexis
  • Muller, Laurent
  • Rahali, Bilel

Abstract

We investigate how institutions can shape differently the expression for efficiency and equity. We run four variants of the triple dictator game and the trust game in a within-subject design that enables to plot individual patterns. A veil of ignorance, a positional fee and information about others’ behaviors are successively introduced to the two standard games. Alongside those treatments, we also control for individual preferences towards risk and other regarding preferences. Results show that while individuals demonstrate consistency in their preferences, the prospect of transfers in the trust game and the veil of ignorance increases efficiency and equity. Second, the option to choose their position as investor at some cost attracts the less cooperative players: they pay to be investor and keep more for themselves. Third, subjects who modify their investment decision after learning the average investment in their group tend to move closer to the average.

Suggested Citation

  • Ambec, Stefan & Garapin, Alexis & Muller, Laurent & Rahali, Bilel, 2019. "How institutions shape individual motives for efficiency and equity: Evidence from distribution experiments," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 128-138.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:81:y:2019:i:c:p:128-138
    DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2019.06.005
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    Cited by:

    1. Ouvrard, Benjamin & Reynaud, Arnaud & Cezera, Stéphane & Thomas, Alban & James, Dishant Jojit & Shivamurthy, Murudaiah, 2025. "Water sharing and equity-efficiency trade-offs: Evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment in India," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    2. Duran-Rodas, David & Villeneuve, Dominic & Pereira, Francisco C. & Wulfhorst, Gebhard, 2020. "How fair is the allocation of bike-sharing infrastructure? Framework for a qualitative and quantitative spatial fairness assessment," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 299-319.
    3. Benjamin Ouvrard & Stefan Ambec & Arnaud Reynaud & Stéphane Cezera & Murudaiah Shivamurthy, 2022. "Sharing rules for a common-pool resource in a lab experiment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(3), pages 605-635, October.
    4. Jake Guth & David Munro, 2020. "Preferences for efficiency and redistribution: An experiment using charitable donations," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 40(3), pages 2217-2226.
    5. Benjamin Ouvrard & Arnaud Reynaud & Stéphane Cezera & Alban Thomas & Dishant Jojit James & Murudaiah Shivamurthy, 2023. "Distributive Justice in the Field: How do Indian Farmers Share Water? ," Working Papers hal-04150233, HAL.
    6. Jin, Shan & Yan, Sibo & Zhang, Xiaomeng, 2025. "Measuring trust across countries: Inconsistencies between experiments and surveys," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 248(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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