Endogenizing the income distribution: The redistributive effect, and Laffer effects, of a progressive tax-benefit system
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Sweeney, George, 1981. "Adoption of Cost-Saving Innovations by a Regulated Firm," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 437-447.
- Andrei Shleifer, 1985. "A Theory of Yardstick Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 319-327.
- Bawa, Vijay S & Sibley, David S, 1980. "Dynamic Behavior of a Firm Subject to Stochastic Regulatory Review," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(3), pages 627-642, October.
- Baron, David P & Myerson, Roger B, 1982. "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 911-930, July.
- Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988.
"Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation,"
Econometric Society, pages 755-785.
- Hardman Moore, John & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," CEPR Discussion Papers 60, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Jean Tirole & Jean-Jaques Laffont, 1985. "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms," Working papers 368, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Jean-Jaques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Auctioning Incentive Contracts," Working papers 403, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- John G. Cross, 1970. "Incentive Pricing and Utility Regulation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, pages 236-253.
- David P. Baron & David Besanko, 1987. "Commitment and Fairness in a Dynamic Regulatory Relationship," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(3), pages 413-436.
- David P. Baron & David Besanko, 1984. "Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and Auditing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 447-470.
- Ingo Vogelsang & Jorg Finsinger, 1979. "A Regulatory Adjustment Process for Optimal Pricing by Multiproduct Monopoly Firms," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 157-171, Spring.
- Sherman, Roger, 1983. "Pricing behavior of the budget-constrained public enterprise," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 381-393, December.
- Henry C. Simons, 1936. "Rules versus Authorities in Monetary Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44, pages 1-1.
- David Sappington, 1980. "Strategic Firm Behavior under a Dynamic Regulatory Adjustment Process," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 360-372, Spring.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 614-641, June.
- Yarrow, George, 1985. "Strategic Issues in Industrial Policy," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(3), pages 95-109, Autumn.
- James C. Cox & R. Mark Isaac, 1987. "Mechanisms for Incentive Regulation: Theory and Experiment," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 348-359.
- Sappington, David E. M., 1986. "Commitment to regulatory bureaucracy," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 243-258, December.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1987. "Auctioning Incentive Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(5), pages 921-937, October.
- Glenn W. Harrison & Michael McKee, 1985. "Monopoly Behavior, Decentralized Regulation, and Contestable Markets: An Experimental Evaluation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 51-69.
- Padmanabhan Srinagesh, 1986. "Nonlinear Prices and the Regulated Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, pages 51-68.
- Roger Sherman, 1970. "The Design of Public Utility Institutions," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, pages 51-58.
- Picard Pierre, 1986. "On the design of incentive schemes under moral hazard and adverse selection," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 8602, CEPREMAP.
- Oliver E. Williamson, 1976. "Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies -- in General and with Respect to CATV," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 73-104, Spring.
- Picard, Pierre, 1987. "On the design of incentive schemes under moral hazard and adverse selection," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 305-331.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
More about this item
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:1:y:1985:i:1:p:3-20. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544 .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.