IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/mateco/v7y1980i3p249-269.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Implementing efficient, anonymous and neutral social choice functions

Author

Listed:
  • Moulin, Herve

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Moulin, Herve, 1980. "Implementing efficient, anonymous and neutral social choice functions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 249-269, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:7:y:1980:i:3:p:249-269
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0304-4068(80)90012-9
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
    2. Moulin, Herve, 1981. "Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 398-412, June.
    3. Peleg, Bezalel & Peters, Hans, 2017. "Feasible elimination procedures in social choice: An axiomatic characterization," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 43-50.
    4. Amorós, Pablo, 2016. "Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 44-57.
    5. Cardona-Coll, Daniel, 1997. "Voting by veto and the role of the compromise function," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 101-113, April.
    6. Manimay Sen, 1984. "Strategy-proofness of a class of Borda rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 251-285, January.
    7. Bag, Parimal Kanti & Sabourian, Hamid & Winter, Eyal, 2009. "Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1278-1299, May.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:7:y:1980:i:3:p:249-269. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.