Implementing efficient, anonymous and neutral social choice functions
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Herbert E. Scarf, 1965. "The Core of an N Person Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 182R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, pages 655-708.
- Moulin, Herve, 1981. "Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 398-412, June.
- Peleg, Bezalel & Peters, Hans, 2017.
"Feasible elimination procedures in social choice: An axiomatic characterization,"
Research in Economics,
Elsevier, pages 43-50.
- Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters, 2015. "Feasible elimination procedures in social choice: an axiomatic characterization," Discussion Paper Series dp693, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Peleg B. & Peters H.J.M., 2016. "Feasible elimination procedures in social choice : an axiomatic characterization," Research Memorandum 001, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- Amorós, Pablo, 2016.
"Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 44-57.
- Pablo Amorós, 2015. "Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms," Working Papers 2015-04, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
- Cardona-Coll, Daniel, 1997. "Voting by veto and the role of the compromise function," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 101-113, April.
- Manimay Sen, 1984. "Strategy-proofness of a class of Borda rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 251-285, January.
- Bag, Parimal Kanti & Sabourian, Hamid & Winter, Eyal, 2009. "Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1278-1299, May.
More about this item
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:7:y:1980:i:3:p:249-269. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.