Implementing efficient, anonymous and neutral social choice functions
No abstract is available for this item.
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2001.
"A crash course in implementation theory,"
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- Cardona-Coll, Daniel, 1997. "Voting by veto and the role of the compromise function," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 101-113, April.
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