Essential stability in games with endogenous sharing rules
We prove that essential games with endogenous sharing rules form a dense residual set and that every game with endogenous sharing rules has at least one minimal essential set of solutions. Furthermore, we establish that essential continuous games form a dense residual set and that every continuous game has at least one minimal essential set of Nash equilibria.
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- Simon, Leo K. & Zame, William R., 1987.
"Discontinous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules,"
Department of Economics, Working Paper Series
qt8n46v2wv, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
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