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Spatial effects and strategic behavior in a multiregional transboundary pollution dynamic game

Author

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  • de Frutos, Javier
  • Martín-Herrán, Guiomar

Abstract

We analyze a transboundary pollution differential game where pollution control is spatially distributed among a number of agents with predetermined spatial relationships. The analysis emphasizes, first, the effects of the different geographical relationships among decision makers; and second, the strategic behaviour of the agents. The dynamic game considers a pollution stock (the state variable) distributed among one large region divided in subregions which control their own emissions of pollutants. The emissions are also represented as distributed variables. The dynamics of the pollution stock is defined by a parabolic partial differential equation. We numerically characterize the feedback Nash equilibrium of a discrete-space model that still captures the spatial interactions among agents. We evaluate the impact of the strategic and spatially dynamic behaviour of the agents on the design of equilibrium environmental policies.

Suggested Citation

  • de Frutos, Javier & Martín-Herrán, Guiomar, 2019. "Spatial effects and strategic behavior in a multiregional transboundary pollution dynamic game," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 182-207.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:97:y:2019:i:c:p:182-207
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2017.08.001
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Boucekkine, Raouf & Fabbri, Giorgio & Federico, Salvatore & Gozzi, Fausto, 2021. "From firm to global-level pollution control: The case of transboundary pollution," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 290(1), pages 331-345.
    2. Boucekkine, Raouf & Fabbri, Giorgio & Federico, Salvatore & Gozzi, Fausto, 2022. "A dynamic theory of spatial externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 133-165.
    3. Boucekkine, Raouf & Ruan, Weihua & Zou, Benteng, 2023. "The irreversible pollution game," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).
    4. Fabbri, Giorgio & Faggian, Silvia & Freni, Giuseppe, 2020. "Policy effectiveness in spatial resource wars: A two-region model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
    5. Boucekkine, Raouf & Fabbri, Giorgio & Federico, Salvatore & Gozzi, Fausto, 2022. "Managing spatial linkages and geographic heterogeneity in dynamic models with transboundary pollution," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    6. Fabbri, Giorgio & Faggian, Silvia & Freni, Giuseppe, 0. "On competition for spatially distributed resources in networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    7. Torre, Davide La & Liuzzi, Danilo & Marsiglio, Simone, 2021. "Transboundary pollution externalities: Think globally, act locally?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
    8. Zhao, Chuanmin & Xie, Rui & Ma, Chunbo & Han, Feng, 2022. "Understanding the haze pollution effects of China's development zone program," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
    9. Raouf Boucekkine & Giorgio Fabbri & Salvatore Federico & Fausto Gozzi, 2020. "A dynamic theory of spatial externalities," Working Papers halshs-02613177, HAL.
    10. Zhonghao Zhang & Tiantian Nie & Yingtao Wu & Jiahui Ling & Danhuang Huang, 2022. "The Temporal and Spatial Distributions and Influencing Factors of Transboundary Pollution in China," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(8), pages 1-15, April.
    11. Javier Frutos & Víctor Gatón & Paula M. López-Pérez & Guiomar Martín-Herrán, 2022. "Investment in Cleaner Technologies in a Transboundary Pollution Dynamic Game: A Numerical Investigation," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 813-843, September.
    12. Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2022. "On the optimal management of environmental stock externalities," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 119(24), pages 2202679119-, June.
    13. Rintaro Yamaguchi, 2021. "Genuine Savings and Sustainability with Resource Diffusion," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 80(2), pages 451-471, October.
    14. Giorgio Fabbri & Silvia Faggian & Giuseppe Freni, 2022. "On competition for spatially distributed resources in networks: an extended version," Working Papers 2022:03, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    15. William Brock & Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2020. "Spatial Environmental and Resource Economics," DEOS Working Papers 2002, Athens University of Economics and Business.
    16. Yijing Zou & Dayi He & Rui Sun, 2023. "Evolutionary Game Analysis of Risk in Third-Party Environmental Governance," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(18), pages 1-20, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Transboundary pollution; Spatial dynamics; Spatially distributed controls; Differential games; Parabolic differential equations;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics
    • R12 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity; Interregional Trade (economic geography)
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis

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