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On the instability of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria

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  • Stahl, Dale II

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  • Stahl, Dale II, 1988. "On the instability of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 59-69, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:9:y:1988:i:1:p:59-69
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    Cited by:

    1. Friedman, Daniel & Zhao, Shuchen, 2021. "When are mixed equilibria relevant?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 51-65.
    2. Rapoport, Amnon & Erev, Ido & Abraham, Elizabeth V. & Olson, David E., 1997. "Randomization and Adaptive Learning in a Simplified Poker Game," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 31-49, January.
    3. Pangallo, Marco & Farmer, J. Doyne & Sanders, James & Galla, Tobias, 2017. "A taxonomy of learning dynamics in 2 × 2 games," INET Oxford Working Papers 2017-06, Institute for New Economic Thinking at the Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford.
    4. Conlisk, John, 2005. "Endogenous rationality and distributions of competence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(4), pages 471-487, April.
    5. Pangallo, Marco & Sanders, James B.T. & Galla, Tobias & Farmer, J. Doyne, 2022. "Towards a taxonomy of learning dynamics in 2 × 2 games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 1-21.
    6. Tone Dieckmann, 1998. "Stochastic Learning and the Evolution of Conventions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 187-212, September.

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