Do managerial incentives facilitate anti-competitive behavior? Evidence from collusion

We examine whether executive pay structures encourage explicit collusion. This is particularly important as the manager determines the firm’s strategy. We link US cartel cases to executive remuneration and firm data for 1994–2017 to exploit variation in the long-term share of compensation using an instrumental variables estimation approach. Our results indicate that a larger share of long-term compensation increases both cartel participation and initiation. This is consistent with a mechanism in which long-term incentives tie managerial wealth to the continuation of profits above the competitive level and reduce gains from deviation. The effects are primarily driven by equity components. In particular, equity-based risk-taking incentives are positively associated with collusion. The results are more pronounced in less competitive industries and among more innovative firms. Our findings imply a governance trade-off: incentive schemes that better align managers with shareholders can raise the incentive to collude. For enforcement purposes, executive pay design is useful for screening and risk assessment.