Simplified methods and efficiency: Stalin's terror managers
This paper examines the institutional methods a brutal dictatorship uses to deal with perceived increases in the number of political enemies despite the fact that its political police and citizen loyalty are fixed in the short run. It explains how "simplified methods" of troika justice, substitution of confession for evidence, and lack of concern about convictions of innocents can produce exceptional increases in convictions by raising the productivity of the political police. Journal of Comparative Economics 37 (2) (2009) 207-216.
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