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A Bowley solution with limited ceded risk for a monopolistic reinsurer

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  • Chi, Yichun
  • Tan, Ken Seng
  • Zhuang, Sheng Chao

Abstract

Borch (1969) advocated that the study of optimal reinsurance design should take into consideration the conflicting interests of both an insurer and a reinsurer. Motivated by this and exploiting a Bowley solution (or Stackelberg equilibrium game), this paper proposes a two-step model that tackles an optimal risk transfer problem between the insurer and the reinsurer. From the insurer’s perspective, the first step of the model provisionally derives an optimal reinsurance policy for a given reinsurance premium while reflecting the reinsurer’s risk appetite. The reinsurer’s risk appetite is controlled by imposing upper limits on the first two moments of the coverage. Through a comparative analysis, the effect of the insurer’s initial wealth on the demand for reinsurance is then examined, when the insurer’s risk aversion and prudence are taken into account. Based on the insurer’s provisional strategy, the second step of the model determines the monopoly premium that maximizes the reinsurer’s expected profit while still satisfying the insurer’s incentive condition. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate our Bowley solution.

Suggested Citation

  • Chi, Yichun & Tan, Ken Seng & Zhuang, Sheng Chao, 2020. "A Bowley solution with limited ceded risk for a monopolistic reinsurer," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 188-201.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:insuma:v:91:y:2020:i:c:p:188-201
    DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2020.02.002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Boonen, Tim J. & Ghossoub, Mario, 2023. "Bowley vs. Pareto optima in reinsurance contracting," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 307(1), pages 382-391.

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