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Fiduciary responsibility and bank-firm relationships: An analysis of shareholder voting by banks

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  • Payne, Thomas H.
  • Millar, James A.
  • William Glezen, G.

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  • Payne, Thomas H. & Millar, James A. & William Glezen, G., 1996. "Fiduciary responsibility and bank-firm relationships: An analysis of shareholder voting by banks," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 75-87, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:3:y:1996:i:1:p:75-87
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jarrow, Robert A. & Leach, J. Chris, 1991. "The Relevance of Fiduciary Conflict-of-Interests in Control versus Issue Proxy Contests," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 26(04), pages 533-547, December.
    2. DeAngelo, Harry & Rice, Edward M., 1983. "Antitakeover charter amendments and stockholder wealth," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 329-359, April.
    3. Bhagat, Sanjai & Brickley, James A, 1984. "Cumulative Voting: The Value of Minority Shareholder Voting Rights," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(2), pages 339-365, October.
    4. Van Nuys, Karen, 1993. "Corporate governance through the proxy process*1: Evidence from the 1989 Honeywell proxy solicitation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 101-132, August.
    5. White, Halbert, 1980. "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 817-838, May.
    6. Brickley, James A. & Lease, Ronald C. & Smith, Clifford Jr., 1988. "Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 267-291, January.
    7. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-1177, December.
    8. Bhagat, Sanjai & Jefferis, Richard H., 1991. "Voting power in the proxy process : The case of antitakeover charter amendments," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 193-225, November.
    9. Pound, John, 1988. "Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 237-265, January.
    10. Jarrell, Gregg A & Brickley, James A & Netter, Jeffry M, 1988. "The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 49-68, Winter.
    11. Brickley, James A. & Lease, Ronald C. & Smith, Clifford Jr., 1994. "Corporate voting: Evidence from charter amendment proposals," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 5-31, March.
    12. Jarrell, Gregg A. & Poulsen, Annette B., 1987. "Shark repellents and stock prices : The effects of antitakeover amendments since 1980," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 127-168, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Santos, Joao A.C. & Rumble, Adrienne S., 2006. "The American keiretsu and universal banks: Investing, voting and sitting on nonfinancials' corporate boards," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 419-454, May.
    2. repec:kap:jfsres:v:51:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s10693-016-0249-y is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Andreani, Ettore & Neuberger, Doris, 2004. "Relationship finance by banks and non-bank institutional investors: A review within the theory of the firm," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 46, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
    4. Boehmer, Ekkehart, 2000. "Business Groups, Bank Control, and Large Shareholders: An Analysis of German Takeovers," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 117-148, April.
    5. Renée Adams & Daniel Ferreira, 2008. "One Share-One Vote: The Empirical Evidence," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 12(1), pages 51-91.
    6. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 2001. "Throwing Good Money after Bad? Board Connections and Conflicts in Bank Lending," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 02-12, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
    7. Adams, Renee B. & Santos, Joao A.C., 2006. "Identifying the effect of managerial control on firm performance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1-2), pages 55-85, April.
    8. Abdioglu, Nida & Bamiatzi, Vassiliki & Cavusgil, S.Tamer & Khurshed, Arif & Stathopoulos, Konstantinos, 2015. "Information asymmetry, disclosure and foreign institutional investment: An empirical investigation of the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 24(5), pages 902-915.
    9. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 1999. "Bankers on Boards: Monitoring, Conflicts of Interest, and Lender Liability," NBER Working Papers 7319, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Laurent Vilanova, 2002. "Risque juridique et rôle des banques dans le gouvernement des entreprises," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 5(4), pages 137-175, December.
    11. Park, Yun W. & Selvili, Zekiye & Song, Moon H., 2008. "Large outside blockholders as monitors: Evidence from partial acquisitions," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 529-545, October.

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