IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ebl/ecbull/eb-24-00481.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Per unit versus ad valorem taxes under strategic bilateral trade

Author

Listed:
  • Gagnie Pascal Yebarth

    (EconomiX, UPL, Université Paris Nanterre)

Abstract

This paper compares ad valorem and per-unit taxes in a bilateral market where all traders have market power. To do so, we use a simple prototype of strategic market games, namely bilateral oligopoly models, and show that ad valorem taxation welfare-dominates per-unit taxation under strategic bilateral trade. Moreover, ad valorem and per-unit taxes have qualitatively different effects on strategic equilibrium offers.

Suggested Citation

  • Gagnie Pascal Yebarth, 2025. "Per unit versus ad valorem taxes under strategic bilateral trade," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 45(1), pages 384-391.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-24-00481
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2025/Volume45/EB-25-V45-I1-P35.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ad valorem taxation; Noncooperative oligopoly; Per unit taxation; Welfare;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-24-00481. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: John P. Conley (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.