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Fiscal disciplining effect of central bank opacity: Stackelberg versus Nash equilibrium [Comment]

Author

Listed:
  • Montserrat Feré

    (Universitat Rovira i Virgili and ECO-SOS)

  • Carolina Manzano

    (Universitat Rovira i Virgili and ECO-SOS)

Abstract

In contrast to Dai and Sidiropoulos (2011), we show that the fiscal disciplining effect associated with central bank opacity about the central's political preference parameter present in a Stackelberg equilibrium is never observed in a Nash equilibrium. disciplining effect associated with central bank opacity about the central's political preference parameter present in a Stackelberg equilibrium is never observed in a Nash equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Montserrat Feré & Carolina Manzano, 2024. "Fiscal disciplining effect of central bank opacity: Stackelberg versus Nash equilibrium [Comment]," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 44(4), pages 1333-1337.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-24-00131
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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2024/Volume44/EB-24-V44-I4-P104.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Meixing Dai & Moïse Sidiropoulos, 2011. "Fiscal disciplining effect of central bank opacity: Stackelberg versus Nash equilibrium," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(4), pages 3068-3076.
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    JEL classification:

    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook

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