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Efficient multi-agent experimentation and multi-choice bandits

Author

Listed:
  • Alejandro Francetich

    (UW Bothell School of Business)

Abstract

The first best in the multi-agent experimentation problem of Klein and Rady (2011) can be reinterpreted as a multi-choice bandit problem where a researcher experiments on up to two projects simultaneously. We exploit this analogy to characterize the optimal strategy: If the cost or the discount rate are low enough, after working on a single project unsuccessfully, the researcher takes on both projects at once. When the “bad project†can also yield successes, as in Keller and Rady (2010), we provide an example where the researcher delays taking on the second project, and we show that she can give up earlier in particular if false positives are arbitrarily unlikely.

Suggested Citation

  • Alejandro Francetich, 2018. "Efficient multi-agent experimentation and multi-choice bandits," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(4), pages 1757-1761.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-18-00559
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nicolas Klein & Sven Rady, 2011. "Negatively Correlated Bandits," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 78(2), pages 693-732.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Experimentation; two-armed bandits; multi-choice bandits; negatively correlated arms; Poisson process;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • D9 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics

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