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Fraud and Monitoring in Non-competitive Elections

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  • Little, Andrew T.

Abstract

This article develops a game-theoretic model that reconciles three facts: (1) fraud is pervasive in non-competitive elections, (2) domestic and international monitoring of elections have become nearly universal and (3) incumbent regimes often invite monitoring and still cheat. The incumbent regime commits fraud to manipulate the information generated by a non-competitive election before a political interaction with some audience. The audience expects fraud, so the incumbent commits fraud because she would appear weak if not doing so. Increasing the visibility of fraud with monitoring is valuable because it lowers the equilibrium level of costly fraud without changing how popular the incumbent appears. The core results hold under multiple extensions, which produce a rich set of comparative static results.

Suggested Citation

  • Little, Andrew T., 2015. "Fraud and Monitoring in Non-competitive Elections," Political Science Research and Methods, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(1), pages 21-41, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:pscirm:v:3:y:2015:i:01:p:21-41_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Xinyu Fan & Feng Yang, 2019. "Strategic promotion, reputation, and responsiveness in bureaucratic hierarchies," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(3), pages 286-307, July.
    2. Edmond, Chris & Lu, Yang K., 2021. "Creating confusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    3. Koenig, Christoph, 2019. "Patronage and Election Fraud: Insights from Russia’s Governors 2000–2012," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 433, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    4. Ananyev, Maxim & Poyker, Michael, 2022. "Do dictators signal strength with electoral fraud?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    5. Little, Andrew T., 2017. "Propaganda and credulity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 224-232.
    6. Andrew T Little, 2017. "Are non-competitive elections good for citizens?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(2), pages 214-242, April.
    7. Hao Hong & Tsz-Ning Wong, 2020. "Authoritarian election as an incentive scheme," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(3), pages 460-493, July.

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