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Tournament-Based Incentives, Corporate Cash Holdings, and the Value of Cash

Author

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  • Phan, Hieu V.
  • Simpson, Thuy
  • Nguyen, Hang T.

Abstract

This research examines the relations between tournament-based incentives and corporate cash holdings and the value of cash. We find robust evidence that tournament-based incentives are positively related to cash holdings and the value of cash. Moreover, the effect of tournament-based incentives on the value of cash is stronger for financially constrained firms. Our evidence indicates that as tournament-based incentives motivate riskier corporate policy choices that lead to not only larger expected shareholder value but also greater cash-flow uncertainty, firms increase cash holdings to cushion potential liquidity shortfalls that may cause underinvestment.

Suggested Citation

  • Phan, Hieu V. & Simpson, Thuy & Nguyen, Hang T., 2017. "Tournament-Based Incentives, Corporate Cash Holdings, and the Value of Cash," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(4), pages 1519-1550, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:52:y:2017:i:04:p:1519-1550_00
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Berent Tomasz & Śniechowski Maciej, 2023. "Corporate sector cash holding – optimal levels, macro context, or external shocks?," International Journal of Management and Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of World Economy, vol. 59(4), pages 297-314, December.
    2. Lou, Xu & Qian, Aimin & Zhang, Chenyu, 2021. "Do CEO's political promotion incentives influence the value of cash holdings: Evidence from state-owned enterprises in China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    3. Marwick, Alex & Hasan, Mostafa Monzur & Luo, Tianpei, 2020. "Organization capital and corporate cash holdings," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    4. Sun, Sophia Li & Habib, Ahsan, 2020. "Determinants and consequences of tournament incentives: A survey of the literature in accounting and finance," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    5. Zheng, Jiayi & Chowdhury, Hasibul & Hossain, Md Safayat & Gupta, Kartick, 2023. "Tournament-based incentives and media sentiment," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2).
    6. Phan, Hieu V. & Nguyen, Nam H. & Nguyen, Hien T. & Hegde, Shantaram, 2019. "Policy uncertainty and firm cash holdings," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 71-82.
    7. Colak, Gonul & Gounopoulos, Dimitrios & Loukopoulos, Panagiotis & Loukopoulos, Georgios, 2021. "Tournament incentives and IPO failure risk," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    8. Tan, Jianhua & Wang, Xiongyuan & Chan, Kam C., 2020. "Does a national reform of a logistics system matter in corporate cash management? Evidence from logistics service standardization in China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    9. Cheong, Chee Seng & Yu, Chia-Feng (Jeffrey) & Zurbruegg, Ralf & Brockman, Paul, 2021. "Tournament incentives and institutional ownership," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 418-433.
    10. Sun, Sophia Li & Habib, Ahsan & Huang, Hedy Jiaying, 2019. "Tournament incentives and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 93-117.
    11. Lee, Chien-Chiang & Wang, Chih-Wei, 2021. "Firms' cash reserve, financial constraint, and geopolitical risk," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    12. Chowdhury, Hasibul & Rahman, Shofiqur, 2023. "Do tournament incentives affect corporate dividend policy?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
    13. Li, Xiaoqing & Fung, Anna & Fung, Hung-Gay & Qiao, Penghao, 2020. "Directorate interlocks and corporate cash holdings in emerging economies: Evidence from China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 244-260.
    14. Nguyen, Nam H. & Phan, Hieu V. & Phan, Hung V. & Tran, Dung T.T. & Vo, Hong, 2020. "Tournament-based incentives and mergers and acquisitions," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    15. Root, Andrew & Yung, Kenneth, 2022. "Resolving agency and product market views of cash holdings," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
    16. Rahman, Shofiqur & Chowdhury, Hasibul, 2023. "Tournament-based incentives and the lease-versus-buy decision," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 148(C).

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