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Political regimes and sovereign credit risk in Europe, 1750–1913

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  • DINCECCO, MARK

Abstract

This article uses a new panel data set to perform a statistical analysis of political regimes and sovereign credit risk in Europe from 1750 to 1913. Old Regime polities typically suffered from fiscal fragmentation and absolutist rule. By the start of World War I, however, many such countries had centralized institutions and limited government. Panel regressions indicate that centralized and/or limited regimes were associated with significant improvements in credit risk relative to fragmented and absolutist ones. Structural break tests also reveal close relationships between major turning points in yield series and political transformations.

Suggested Citation

  • Dincecco, Mark, 2009. "Political regimes and sovereign credit risk in Europe, 1750–1913," European Review of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 31-63, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:ereveh:v:13:y:2009:i:01:p:31-63_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Peter H. Lindert, 2009. "Revealing Failures in the History of School Finance," NBER Working Papers 15491, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Damian Clarke & Manuel Llorca Jaña & Daniel Pailañir, 2023. "The use of quantile methods in economic history," Historical Methods: A Journal of Quantitative and Interdisciplinary History, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 56(2), pages 115-132, April.
    3. Chilosi, David, 2014. "Risky Institutions: Political Regimes and the Cost of Public Borrowing in Early Modern Italy," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 74(3), pages 887-915, September.
    4. Mark Dincecco, 2010. "The Political Economy Of Fiscal Prudence In Historical Perspective," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(1), pages 1-36, March.
    5. John A. Dove, 2017. "Judicial Independence and US State Bond Ratings: An Empirical Investigation," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(3), pages 24-46, September.
    6. Stasavage, David, 2016. "What we can learn from the early history of sovereign debt," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 1-16.
    7. Esteban Serrano-Monge, 2022. "Inferences from Portfolio Theory and Efficient Market Hypothesis to the Impact of Social Media on Sovereign Debt: Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 15(4), pages 1-16, March.
    8. Vesperoni , Alberto, 2013. "War Finance and the Modern State," NEPS Working Papers 6/2013, Network of European Peace Scientists.
    9. Andreea-Alexandra Maerean & Maja Pedersen & Paul Sharp, 2021. "Sovereign Debt and Supersanctions in Emerging Markets: Evidence from Four Southeast European Countries, 1878-1913," Working Papers 0216, European Historical Economics Society (EHES).
    10. Christiaan Bochove, 2014. "External debt and commitment mechanisms: Danish borrowing in Holland, 1763–1825," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 67(3), pages 652-677, August.
    11. Andrea Papadia, 2024. "Fiscal policy under constraints: Fiscal capacity and austerity during the Great Depression," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 77(1), pages 90-118, February.
    12. Christoph Wegener & Tobias Basse & Frederik Kunze & Hans-Jörg von Mettenheim, 2016. "Oil prices and sovereign credit risk of oil producing countries: an empirical investigation," Quantitative Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(12), pages 1961-1968, December.

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