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Incomplete Information and Ideological Explanations of Platform Divergence

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  • Morton, Rebecca B.

Abstract

One of the paradoxes of formal spatial voting models is the robustness of the theoretical result that candidates will converge toward centrists positions and the empirical observation of persistent policy divergence of candidates. A solution is that candidates are ideological (have policy preferences). When candidates have policy preferences and incomplete information about voter preferences, then platform divergence is theoretically predicted. Experimental tests of the ideological model are presented. It is shown that platform divergence is significant when candidates are ideological and have incomplete information about voter preferences. However, candidate positions are more convergent, on average, than the theory predicts, suggesting that subjects value winning independently of the expected payment.

Suggested Citation

  • Morton, Rebecca B., 1993. "Incomplete Information and Ideological Explanations of Platform Divergence," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(2), pages 382-392, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:87:y:1993:i:02:p:382-392_10
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    Cited by:

    1. Roman M. Sheremeta, 2010. "Expenditures and Information Disclosure in Two-Stage Political Contests," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 54(5), pages 771-798, October.
    2. Alejandro Saporiti, 2008. "Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in Electoral Competition Games: The Hybrid Case," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(5), pages 827-857, October.
    3. Natalia Jiménez & Ángel Solano-García, 2015. "Elected Officials’ Opportunistic Behavior on Third-Party Punishment: An Experimental Analysis," Working Papers. Serie EC 2015-04, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    4. Drouvelis, Michalis & Saporiti, Alejandro & Vriend, Nicolaas J., 2014. "Political motivations and electoral competition: Equilibrium analysis and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 86-115.
    5. Tangeras, T.P., 1998. "On the Role of Public Opinion Polls in Political Competition," Papers 655, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
    6. Natalia Jimenez & Angel Solano-Garcia, 2016. "Elected Officials’ Opportunistic Behavior on Third-Party Punishment: An experimental Analysis," Working Papers 16.15, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
    7. Alejandro Saporiti, 2010. "Power, ideology, and electoral competition," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 1003, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    8. Roger Congleton, 2001. "Rational Ignorance, Rational Voter Expectations, and Public Policy: A Discrete Informational Foundation for Fiscal Illusion," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1), pages 35-64, April.
    9. Vjollca Sadiraj & Jan Tuinstra & Frans Winden, 2006. "A computational electoral competition model with social clustering and endogenous interest groups as information brokers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(1), pages 169-187, October.
    10. Sebastian Galiani & Cheryl Long & Camila Navajas Ahumada & Gustavo Torrens, 2019. "Horizontal and Vertical Conflict: Experimental Evidence," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 72(2), pages 239-269, May.
    11. John Cadigan, 2005. "The Citizen Candidate Model: An Experimental Analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 197-216, April.
    12. Evan Osborne, 1998. "A theory of gridlock: Strategic behavior in legislative deliberations," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 26(3), pages 238-251, September.
    13. Sugato Dasgupta, 2009. "The disciplining role of repeated elections: some experimental evidence," New Zealand Economic Papers, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(2), pages 165-190.

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