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The Allocation of Federal Aid Monies: The Synthesis of Demand-Side and Supply-Side Explanations

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  • Stein, Robert M.

Abstract

Previous research on the distribution of federal aid monies has been dominated by the donor's perspective. Different distribution formulas, political influence of congressional representatives, bureaucrats, and individual aid recipients have been studied as the sole determinants of aid allocations. Each explanation, however, fails to examine the question of aid allocations from a demand-side perspective. This omission assumes that all governmental units are equally desirous of federal assistance and that any bias in the distribution of federal aid is a function of supply-side conditions. Identifying a linkage between demand-side and supply-side determinants of aid allocations, this article proposes and tests hypotheses derived from an integrated model of federal aid allocations.

Suggested Citation

  • Stein, Robert M., 1981. "The Allocation of Federal Aid Monies: The Synthesis of Demand-Side and Supply-Side Explanations," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 75(2), pages 334-343, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:75:y:1981:i:02:p:334-343_17
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    Cited by:

    1. Riemer P. Faber & Pierre Koning, 2017. "Why not fully spend a conditional block grant?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(1), pages 60-95, February.
    2. Elena Jarocińska, 2010. "Intergovernmental grants in Russia," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 18(2), pages 405-427, April.
    3. B S Rundquist, 1983. "Political Benefits and Public Policy: Interpretation of Recent US Studies," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 1(4), pages 401-412, December.
    4. Valentino Larcinese & Leonzio Rizzo & Cecilia Testa, 2005. "Allocating the US Federal Budget to the States: the Impact of the President," STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series 03, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    5. Freinkman, Lev & Haney, Michael, 1997. "What affects the Russian regional governments'propensity to subsidize?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1818, The World Bank.
    6. Riemer P. Faber & Pierre Koning, 2017. "Why not fully spend a conditional block grant?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(1), pages 60-95, February.
    7. Greenberg, Michael & Irving, Will & Zimmerman, Rae, 2009. "Allocating U.S. Department of Homeland Security funds to States with explicit equity, population and energy facility security criteria," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(4), pages 229-239, December.
    8. Xin Wan & Yuanyuan Ma & Kezhong Zhang, 2015. "Political determinants of intergovernmental transfers in a regionally decentralized authoritarian regime: evidence from China," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(27), pages 2803-2820, June.
    9. Sloan Margaret F., 2013. "The Substance of Things Hoped For: Do State Faith-Based and Community Partnership Offices and Liaisons Help Grassroots Organizations Get Federal Funding?," Nonprofit Policy Forum, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 111-137, November.
    10. Shirley Svorny & Leah Marcal, 2002. "The Allocation Of Federal Funds To Promote Bureaucratic Objectives: An Empirical Test," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 20(3), pages 209-220, July.
    11. Jeffrey Lazarus, 2010. "Giving the People What They Want? The Distribution of Earmarks in the U.S. House of Representatives," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(2), pages 338-353, April.

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