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Theoretical Foundations and Empirical Evaluations of Partisan Fairness in District-Based Democracies

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  • KATZ, JONATHAN N.
  • KING, GARY
  • ROSENBLATT, ELIZABETH

Abstract

We clarify the theoretical foundations of partisan fairness standards for district-based democratic electoral systems, including essential assumptions and definitions not previously recognized, formalized, or in some cases even discussed. We also offer extensive empirical evidence for assumptions with observable implications. We cover partisan symmetry, the most commonly accepted fairness standard, and other perspectives. Throughout, we follow a fundamental principle of statistical inference too often ignored in this literature—defining the quantity of interest separately so its measures can be proven wrong, evaluated, and improved. This enables us to prove which of the many newly proposed fairness measures are statistically appropriate and which are biased, limited, or not measures of the theoretical quantity they seek to estimate at all. Because real-world redistricting and gerrymandering involve complicated politics with numerous participants and conflicting goals, measures biased for partisan fairness sometimes still provide useful descriptions of other aspects of electoral systems.

Suggested Citation

  • Katz, Jonathan N. & King, Gary & Rosenblatt, Elizabeth, 2020. "Theoretical Foundations and Empirical Evaluations of Partisan Fairness in District-Based Democracies," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 114(1), pages 164-178, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:114:y:2020:i:1:p:164-178_12
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    Cited by:

    1. Aaron Brick & Cameron Brick, 2021. "Districting that minimizes partisan bias," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 8(1), pages 1-6, December.
    2. Barry Burden & Corwin Smidt, 2020. "Evaluating Legislative Districts Using Measures of Partisan Bias and Simulations," SAGE Open, , vol. 10(4), pages 21582440209, December.
    3. Anton Kolotilin & Alexander Wolitzky, 2020. "The Economics of Partisan Gerrymandering," Discussion Papers 2020-12, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    4. Felix J. Bierbrauer & Mattias Polborn & Felix Bierbrauer, 2020. "Competitive Gerrymandering and the Popular Vote," CESifo Working Paper Series 8654, CESifo.
    5. Andrei Gomberg & Romans Pancs & Tridib Sharma, 2023. "Electoral Maldistricting," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 64(3), pages 1223-1264, August.
    6. Serhat Hasancebi, 2023. "The Maltese single transferable vote experience: a case study of gerrymandering?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 34(4), pages 572-597, December.
    7. Michael Geruso & Dean Spears & Ishaana Talesara, 2022. "Inversions in US Presidential Elections: 1836–2016," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 327-357, January.
    8. Christopher Warshaw & Eric McGhee & Michal Migurski, 2022. "Districts for a New Decade—Partisan Outcomes and Racial Representation in the 2021–22 Redistricting Cycle," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 52(3), pages 428-451.

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