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Antidumping protection and R&D competition

Author

Listed:
  • Xiwang Gao
  • Kaz Miyagiwa

Abstract

In recent years antidumping protection has spread throughout the world. Evidence shows that antidumping often targets R&D-intensive sectors, raising a concern that it may adversely affect worldwide investments in R&D. We investigate this issue in a model of reciprocal dumping extended to a two-stage game, in which two firms first choose R&D levels and then compete in prices. We find that, when a single government institutes antidumping law, the protected firm decreases investment in R&D, while the constrained firm invests more. When both governments engage in antidumping actions, both firms invest more in R&D than under free trade.

Suggested Citation

  • Xiwang Gao & Kaz Miyagiwa, 2005. "Antidumping protection and R&D competition," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 38(1), pages 211-227, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:38:y:2005:i:1:p:211-227
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kaz Miyagiwa & Huasheng Song & Hylke Vandenbussche, 2016. "Accounting for Stylised Facts about Recent Anti-dumping: Retaliation and Innovation," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(2), pages 221-235, February.
    2. Patrice Bougette & Christophe Charlier, 2017. "Antidumping and Feed-In Tariffs as Good Buddies? Modeling the EU-China Solar Panel Dispute," GREDEG Working Papers 2017-17, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis.
    3. Kao, Kuo-Feng & Peng, Cheng-Hau, 2016. "Anti-dumping protection, price undertaking and product innovation," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 53-64.
    4. MUKUNOKI Hiroshi, 2017. "Does Trade Liberalization Promote Antidumping Protection? A theoretical analysis," Discussion papers 17031, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    5. Miyagiwa, Kaz & Song, Huasheng & Vandenbussche, Hylke, 2010. "Innovation, antidumping, and retaliation," CEPR Discussion Papers 7916, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Mukunoki, Hiroshi, 2016. "Preferential trade agreements and antidumping actions against members and nonmembers," IDE Discussion Papers 611, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization(JETRO).
    7. Wu, Shih-Jye & Chang, Yang-Ming & Chen, Hung-Yi, 2014. "Antidumping duties and price undertakings: A welfare analysis," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 97-107.
    8. Huasheng Song & Hylke Vandenbussche, 2008. "Trade Policy and Innovation," LICOS Discussion Papers 20008, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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