IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cje/issued/v36y2003i2p350-372.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Should land and capital be taxed at a uniform rate?

Author

Listed:
  • Kangoh Lee

Abstract

If jurisdictions are allowed to tax land and capital separately, they tax only land, because capital taxation distorts the allocation of mobile capital. To exploit absentee owners, however, jurisdictions tax land beyond the efficient level. As absentee ownership increases throughout the economy, land taxation results in greater inefficiency. To alleviate the inefficiency of overtaxing land, the higher-level government intervenes to require jurisdictions to tax both capital and land at a uniform rate, because the desire to attract capital lowers the tax rate. Uniform taxation of land and capital, or property taxation, thus may be more efficient than separate taxation.

Suggested Citation

  • Kangoh Lee, 2003. "Should land and capital be taxed at a uniform rate?," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 36(2), pages 350-372, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:36:y:2003:i:2:p:350-372
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://economics.ca/cgi/xms?jab=v36n2/04.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: Available to subscribers only. Alternative access through JSTOR and Ingenta.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kunce, Mitch & Shogren, Jason F., 2008. "Efficient decentralized fiscal and environmental policy: A dual purpose Henry George tax," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 569-573, April.
    2. Petrucci, Alberto, 2006. "The incidence of a tax on pure rent in a small open economy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 921-933, May.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:36:y:2003:i:2:p:350-372. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Prof. Werner Antweiler). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/ceaaaea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.