The Closed-Loop Motive for Voluntary Export Restraints
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- L. Lambertini & A. Palestini, 2017. "Voluntary Export Restraints in a Trade Model with Sticky Price: Linear and Nonlinear Feedback Solutions," Working Papers wp1109, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Açıkgöz, Ömer T. & Benchekroun, Hassan, 2017.
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"When Are Voluntary Export Restraints Voluntary? A Differential Game Approach,"
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- Kenji Fujiwara, 2010. "When Are Voluntary Export Restraints Voluntary? : A Differential Game Approach," Discussion Paper Series 52, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Apr 2010.
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"Export restraints in a model of trade with capital accumulation,"
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"Workers’ enterprises are not perverse: differential oligopoly games with sticky price,"
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- R. Cellini & L. Lambertini, 2004. "Workers' Enterprises Are Not Perverse: Differential Oligopoly Games with Sticky Price," Working Papers 531, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
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"A differential oligopoly game with differentiated goods and sticky prices,"
European Journal of Operational Research,
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- R. Cellini & L. Lambertini, 2002. "A Differential Oligopoly Game with Differentiated Goods and Sticky Prices," Working Papers 440, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Giacomo Calzolari & Luca Lambertini, 2006.
"Tariffs vs Quotas in a Model of Trade with Capital Accumulation,"
Review of International Economics,
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- G. Calzolari & L. Lambertini, 2000. "Tariffs vs Quotas in a Model of Trade with Capital Accumulation," Working Papers 392, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- repec:spr:dyngam:v:8:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s13235-018-0251-0 is not listed on IDEAS
- Benchekroun, Hassan, 2003. "Unilateral production restrictions in a dynamic duopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 214-239, August.
- Benchekroun, Hassan & Ray Chaudhuri, Amrita, 2014. "Transboundary pollution and clean technologies," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 601-619.
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