When Are Voluntary Export Restraints Voluntary? : A Differential Game Approach
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- Kenji Fujiwara, 2010. "When Are Voluntary Export Restraints Voluntary? A Differential Game Approach," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(2), pages 101-110, June.
References listed on IDEAS
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- L. Lambertini & A. Palestini, 2017. "Voluntary Export Restraints in a Trade Model with Sticky Price: Linear and Nonlinear Feedback Solutions," Working Papers wp1109, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
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