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Eurobonds und Transferleistungen innerhalb der Eurozone

Author

Listed:
  • Georg Erber

Abstract

Nach Ansicht von Georg Erber, Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin, haben Eurobonds nur sehr begrenzte Möglichkeiten, das Staatsschuldenproblem der Eurozone zu lösen. Solides Wirtschaften Einzelner zahle sich innerhalb einer Schuldengemeinschaft nicht aus.

Suggested Citation

  • Georg Erber, 2012. "Eurobonds und Transferleistungen innerhalb der Eurozone," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 65(01), pages 14-19, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ifosdt:v:65:y:2012:i:01:p:14-19
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Patrick Bolton & Olivier Jeanne, 2011. "Sovereign Default Risk and Bank Fragility in Financially Integrated Economies," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 59(2), pages 162-194, June.
    2. Tim Oliver Berg & Kai Carstensen & Hans-Werner Sinn, 2011. "Was kosten Eurobonds?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 64(17), pages 25-33, September.
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    JEL classification:

    • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General

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