Tax Coercion Versus Voluntary Compliance: The Impact Of Forced Enforcement On Taxpayers In The European Union

In the context of intensifying tax revenue collection measures and the need to streamline tax administration in the European Union member states, tax enforcement remains an essential, but often controversial, tool in ensuring taxpayer compliance. This paper analyzes the complex relationship between tax coercion – understood as a set of coercive measures imposed by tax authorities – and taxpayer voluntary compliance, through the lens of the impact that enforcement has on tax behavior, financial stability and the perception of the authorities. The research starts from the premise that the intensive application of forced execution can generate contradictory effects: on the one hand, it can increase the collection rate in the short term; on the other hand, it can damage the taxpayer's relationship with the tax administration, generating a decrease in voluntary compliance in the long term. Both the financial implications of forced execution on individuals and legal entities, as well as the differences in legislative and administrative approaches between EU member states are analyzed. Through a mixed research method – which includes the analysis of the European regulatory framework, case studies, interviews with tax experts and the interpretation of statistical data available at Eurostat and ANAF – the study provides a clear picture of how foreclosure influences taxpayers’ tax decisions. It also identifies good practices in preventing foreclosure through assisted compliance policies, payment installments and administrative dialogue. The conclusions highlight the need for a balance between tax authority and cooperation, supporting the implementation of strategies that reduce reliance on coercive measures in favor of tax education, transparency, and the stimulation of voluntary compliance.