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What Does Improved Spectrum Management Mean For The Philippines?

Author

Listed:
  • JASON PATALINGHUG

    (SOUTHERN CONNECTICUT STATE UNIVERSITY NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT, USA)

  • EPICTETUS PATALINGHUG

    (UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES DILIMAN QUEZON CITY, PHILIPPINES)

Abstract

This paper analyzes spectrum management practices in the Philippines. It examines the literature on what the Philippines and other countries have done when it comes to allocating spectrum rights. The regulatory body in the Philippines allocates available spectrum via an administrative approach which lacks transparency and due process. This paper recommends that the regulatory body adopts the auction method in allocating spectrum. This method hasbeen proven to be transparent, fair, and cost-effective method if a suitable design is adopted. There are very few studies that look at spectrum management in the Philippines. This paper offers some policy recommendations that can help the Philippines in allocating spectrum rights more efficiently and increase its government’s revenues.

Suggested Citation

  • Jason Patalinghug & Epictetus Patalinghug, 2019. "What Does Improved Spectrum Management Mean For The Philippines?," Annals - Economy Series, Constantin Brancusi University, Faculty of Economics, vol. 5, pages 29-35, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:cbu:jrnlec:y:2019:v:5:p:29-35
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Milgrom,Paul, 2004. "Putting Auction Theory to Work," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521536721, January.
    2. World Bank, 2005. "Philippines : Meeting the Infrastructure Challenges," World Bank Publications - Reports 8459, The World Bank Group.
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