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Vieillissement de la population en Italie et efficacité des réformes Amato et Dini : un modèle d'équilibre général à générations imbriquées


  • Riccardo Magnani


The objective of this paper is to analyse the impacts of the ageing of the Italian population on the economic system and in particular on the pension system in order to evaluate the efficiency of the reforms introduced during the Nineties (Amato reform in 1992 and Dini reform in 1995). An overlapping-generations general equilibrium model is built in order to evaluate both the macroeconomic impacts and the evolution of the pension system in terms of financial deficit and intergeneration equity.

Suggested Citation

  • Riccardo Magnani, 2006. "Vieillissement de la population en Italie et efficacité des réformes Amato et Dini : un modèle d'équilibre général à générations imbriquées," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 72(3), pages 287-338.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:reldbu:rel_723_0287

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. B. Caillaud & R. Guesnerie & P. Rey, 1992. "Noisy Observation in Adverse Selection Models," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(3), pages 595-615.
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    3. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 614-641, June.
    4. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    5. Stewart, Jay, 1994. "The Welfare Implications of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Competitive Insurance Markets," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 32(2), pages 193-208, April.
    6. Peter S. Faynzilberg & Praveen Kumar, 2000. "original papers : On the generalized principal-agent problem: Decomposition and existence results," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 5(1), pages 23-58.
    7. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
    8. Faynzilberg, Peter S. & Kumar, Praveen, 1997. "Optimal Contracting of Separable Production Technologies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 15-39, October.
    9. Picard, Pierre, 1987. "On the design of incentive schemes under moral hazard and adverse selection," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 305-331, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. R. Magnani, 2005. "Retirement age, immigration or pension benefits ? An applied general equilibrium evaluation of a pension reform in an ageing context (the Italian case)," THEMA Working Papers 2005-11, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    2. Mouez Fodha & Patricia Le Maitre, 2007. "Transition démographique, chômage involontaire et redistribution intergénérationnelle : simulations dans un cadre d'équilibre général à générations imbriquées," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne v07011, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    3. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00144652 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Magnani, Riccardo, 2011. "A general equilibrium evaluation of the sustainability of the new pension reforms in Italy," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 5-35, March.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D58 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
    • J10 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - General


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