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Middlemen in the Shapley-Shubik Competitive Markets for Indivisible Goods

Author

Listed:
  • Oishi Takayuki

    (Faculty of Economics, Aomori Public University)

  • Sakaue Shin

    (Graduate School of Global Environmental Studies, Sophia University)

Abstract

We generalize the Shapley-Shubik market model for indivisible goods by considering the case where agents need middlemen to exchange their indivisible goods. In this model, there always exist competitive equilibria in which transaction takes place directly between sellers and buyers or indirectly through the middlemen. Furthermore, the incentives of middlemen to enter the market exist. We derive these results from the existence of an integral solution for a partitioning linear program.

Suggested Citation

  • Oishi Takayuki & Sakaue Shin, 2014. "Middlemen in the Shapley-Shubik Competitive Markets for Indivisible Goods," Mathematical Economics Letters, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1-2), pages 1-8, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:maecol:v:2:y:2014:i:1-2:p:8:n:5
    DOI: 10.1515/mel-2013-0024
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Quint, Thomas, 1991. "The core of an m-sided assignment game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 487-503, November.
    2. Quint, Thomas, 1991. "Necessary and sufficient conditions for balancedness in partitioning games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 87-91, August.
    3. Kaneko, Mamoru, 1983. "Housing markets with indivisibilities," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 22-50, January.
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