Testing for Adverse Selection in China's Auto Insurance Market
This paper empirically examines the adverse selection models by using the data from Chinas personal automobile insurance market through the standard positive-correlation test. Results show that higher-risk insurance policyholders do tend to buy insurance with a lower coinsurance rate, which supports the existence of adverse selection in China's automobile insurance market. This is quite a contrast to the findings in mature insurance markets.
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Volume (Year): 5 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Georges Dionne & Christian Gourieroux & Charles Vanasse, 2001. "Testing for Evidence of Adverse Selection in the Automobile Insurance Market: A Comment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 444-473, April.
- Puelz, Robert & Snow, Arthur, 1994. "Evidence on Adverse Selection: Equilibrium Signaling and Cross-Subsidization in the Insurance Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(2), pages 236-257, April.
- Gao, Feng & Powers, Michael R. & Wang, Jun, 2009. "Adverse selection or advantageous selection? Risk and underwriting in China's health-insurance market," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 505-510, June.
- Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
- Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Bernard Salanie, 2000.
"Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets,"
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University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(1), pages 56-78, February.
- Pierre-André Chiappori & Bernard Salanié, 1997. "Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets," Working Papers 97-11, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
- Dahlby, B. G., 1983. "Adverse selection and statistical discrimination : An analysis of Canadian automobile insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 121-130, February.
- Crocker, Keith J & Snow, Arthur, 1986. "The Efficiency Effects of Categorical Discrimination in the Insurance Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(2), pages 321-344, April.
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