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What Role for Trade in a Post‐2012 Global Climate Policy Regime

  • John Whalley

This paper discusses the role that trade can potentially play in both negotiating and operating a post Kyoto/post 2012 global climate policy regime. As an addition to the bargaining set for a global climate negotiation, trade in principle widens the range of jointly beneficial potential outcomes and can in this sense be a potential facilitator of an agreed global climate regime. The reverse is also true, that in a linked climate-trade-finance global policy coordination structure that goes well beyond what was envisioned at Bretton Woods, climate now added to the global policy bargaining set also offers the prospect of potentially stronger trade disciplines (and even beyond WTO disciplines being negotiated). Trade policy can as well be an instrument for the implementation of a global climate regime, since trade provides a mechanism for achieving an internalization outcome for the global externality that climate change represents, and that provides a potentially more efficient outcome and also helps meet distributional objectives. In short, trade added to the emerging post 2012 climate regime can both expand the bargaining set for both (effectively linked) negotiations, and additionally provide an instrument for the implementation of an agreed outcome.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2011.01422.x
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Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal The World Economy.

Volume (Year): 34 (2011)
Issue (Month): 11 (November)
Pages: 1844-1862

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Handle: RePEc:bla:worlde:v:34:y:2011:i:11:p:1844-1862
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  1. Ben Lockwood & John Whalley, 2008. "Carbon Motivated Border Tax Adjustments: Old Wine in Green Bottles?," NBER Working Papers 14025, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Lisandro Abrego & Carlo Perroni & John Whalley & Randall M. Wigle, 1997. "Trade and Environment: Bargaining Outcomes from Linked Negotiations," NBER Working Papers 6216, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-94, Supplemen.
  4. Yan Dong & John Walley, 2012. "How Large Are The Impacts Of Carbon Motivated Border Tax Adjustments?," Climate Change Economics (CCE), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 3(01), pages 1250001-1-1.
  5. Abrego, Lisandro, et al, 2001. "Trade and Environment: Bargaining Outcomes from Linked Negotiations," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(3), pages 414-28, August.
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